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Abstract
Opacity has economy-wide implications. A lack of
information, whether from non-disclosure or complexity of
business, creates uncertainty that even the most sophisticated
of investors must face. In this paper, I analyze the relationship
between opacity and the systematic risk of bank holding
companies. Specifically, I find that investments in opaque assets
required to be reported at fair value significantly affect the levels
of financial institutions’ systematic risk. Furthermore, I provide
evidence that firm investments in opaque assets contribute to
systematic risk to an even greater degree during times of financial
crisis.
I. Introduction
Accurately assessing the true economic value of any firm
can be an arduous task. When attempting to assess the underlying
value of a portfolio of assets, information becomes critical. A
lack of information, whether as a result of non-disclosure or
complexity of business, creates uncertainty that even the most
sophisticated of investors must face. Furthermore, the inherent
nature of the banking industry lends itself to even greater
informational asymmetries that manifest themselves in the form
of opacity (Morgan, 2002). The existence of opacity in banks has
economy-wide implications due to the vital role that financial
institutions play in general economic activity (Bernanke, 1983).
In this paper, I examine the relationship between financial opacity
and the systematic risk of bank holding companies. Specifically,
I investigate the impact of investments in assets required to
be reported at fair value on the systematic risk of financial
institutions.
	The consequences of opacity have justified special regulatory
oversight within the financial industry, as investors are forced
to use non-firm specific valuation parameters to assess firm
specific assets (Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran, 2004). In
opaque industries such as banking, contagion that arises as a
consequence of industry-wide revaluation around firm-specific
events engenders an environment conducive to the development
of speculative bubbles and crashes. Arising from the inability of
investors to distinguish between bank-specific and systematic
events, contagion is a product of information asymmetry
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Disclosure standards attempt to
mitigate risks associated with opacity and information asymmetry
by reducing the information gap between bank-insiders and
investors. However, even full disclosure may not adequately
resolve the problems associated with opacity (Jones, Lee, and
Yeager, 2011a).
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	Opacity also influences the composition of a firm’s risk.
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show how opaque markets tend
to have greater systematic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk. The
positive relationship between opacity and systematic risk occurs
because, in the absence of reliable, firm-specific information, a
firm’s equity price tends to just “follow along” with the overall
movement of the market. Jones, Lee, and Yeager (2011a)
demonstrate how the increasing opacity of banks during the period
2000-2006 increased the systematic risk of banks while decreasing
idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the more opaque banks suffered the
greatest price decline during the 2007 financial crisis.
In this paper, I use a recent change in U.S. accounting rules
to examine the impact of opacity on the systematic risk of banks.
In 2007, US accounting regulatory bodies introduced SFAS 157,
Fair Value Measurement, to address the increasing investment
by financial institutions in illiquid and opaque assets. SFAS 157
requires firms to report certain assets at fair value, classified
into categories of Level 1, 2, and 3. Across Level 1, 2, and 3
classifications, investors face greater degrees of information risk
– uncertainty regarding the valuation parameters for underlying
assets. To investigate the contributions of opacity to systematic
risk, I utilize such fair value measurements to capture increasing
levels of illiquidity and opacity. Consistent with previous finance
literature, my results show that opacity is positively related to the
systematic risk of banks.
II. Hypothesis Development and Research Design
My hypotheses and analysis build upon the assertions
in previous work that information risk of bank assets is nondiversifiable in an economy (Easley and O’Hara 2004; Lambert,
Leuz, and Verrachia 2007; Jones, Lee, and Yeager 2011b).
When one bank’s assets are particularly hard to value due to
their opaque nature, outside investors must turn to idiosyncratic
valuation parameters of other opaque yet seemingly similar firms.
Consequentially, the correlation between the entire industry is
intensified. As the industry-wide asset composition of financial
firms contains relatively greater degrees of opaque assets than the
non-financial industry, investors face difficulty in discriminating
across good banks and bad banks (Morgan 2002). Such a scenario
creates return synchronicity, reduces idiosyncratic risk, and
increases systematic risk (Jones, Lee, and Yeager, 2011b).
To evaluate the impact of opacity on systematic risk, I take
advantage of recent accounting disclosure requirements that force
financial institutions to report assets at Fair Value (SFAS, 157).
Fair value is defined by SFAS 157 as “the price that would be
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly
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In this section, I first analyze the impact of Level 2 and Level
H1: Level 2 and 3 assets should be positively related to a
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2

In (3), ri, d, q is the equity return for firm i on day d in quarter q; r i, d, q , the excess equity return over
day d in quarter q; and vi, d, q , the dollar trading volume on day d in quarter q. The equation is intende
related to lack of liquidity. The coefficient of reflects the liquidity risk of the stock and will be negati
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Table
1: Summary
for each
variable for
witheach
number
of quarterly
collected
and used.
This table
reportsstatistics
descriptive
statistics
variable
in theobservations
study. It also
presents
the number of quarterly observations both collected and used.

Quarter

Observations

Variable

Mean

Median

Std Dev

31-Mar-07
30-Jun-07
30-Sep-07
31-Dec-07
31-Mar-08
30-Jun-08
30-Sep-08
31-Dec-08
31-Mar-09
30-Jun-09
30-Sep-09
31-Dec-09
31-Mar-10
30-Jun-10
30-Sep-10

9
9
9
9
38
38
50
51
55
89
90
88
88
86
85

Dependent Variable
MktBeta

1.5845809

1.4922536

0.7254663

Explanatory Variables
OA/Intercept
FV2
FV3
Liab_to_Assets

80.24%
18.46%
1.19%
89.12%

85.35%
13.64%
0.32%
89.85%

24.49%
23.36%
1.83%
7.31%

Total Observations Collected
Missing of Observations with Missing Values

794
8

Total Observations Used

786

Figure 1: Fair Value Assets Relative to Total Assets
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Table 2: Decomposition of equity beta: ordinary least squares and weighted least squares results of regression.
Table 2: Decomposition of equity beta: ordinary least squares and weighted least squares results of regression.

Ordinary Least Squares Decomposition of Beta

Variable
Asset Portfolios
Other Assets/Intercept
FV2
FV3
Liab_to_assets

Coefficient

t-statistic

1.44931***
-0.5086***
8.89846***
0.13405

Weighted Least Squares Decomposition of Beta

Coefficient

4.67
-3.38
5.23
0.38

1.49342***
-0.26891**
9.97159***
-0.20336

t-statistic

6.67
-2.32
6.19
-0.8

Model Analysis
R2
0.0358
0.0503
Adj R2 I first analyze the impact of Level 2 and Level
0.03213 assets on the systematic risk of the bank. I then examine
0.0467the
In this section,
F-Value each type of asset makes to overall systematic
9.68 risk and the temporal differences of the impact on systematic
13.81
relative contribution
N
786
786
risk during crisis
and non-crisis periods.
*p< .10, ** p< .05, ***p< .01

IV.A. OpacityThis
andtable
Equity
reportsRisk
the ordinary least squares and weighted least squares results of regressing market beta (scaled equity beta for firm I in quarter j) on the FV2 and FV3 components of the
decomposed financial asset compositions of sampled firms. The basic model development follows that of Riedl and Serafeim (2009). For both the OLS and WLS models, market beta was
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as theimpact
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regression:
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MktBetaij 
 i  1 FV 2ij   2 FV 3ij  3 Liab _ to _ Assetsij   ij

(2)
FV3 assets, FV2 assets carry with them much less information
day d in quarter q; and vi, d, q , the dollar trading volume on day d
risk. Inforfact,
it appears
that investments
in FV2
may
actually
controlling
leverage.
The intercept
term represents
theassets
average
market
beta for other assets (OA), and the coefficients
β and β2,
in
quarter q. The equation is intended1 to capture
return reversals
reduce acontribution
firm’s systematic
noted
earlier,respectively.
FV2 assetsTable
are 2 presents
the marginal
of Levelrisk.
2 andAs
Level
3 assets,
the results of estimations using both
related
to
lack
of
liquidity.
coefficient
of
reflects
the liquidity
The
1
required
to be valued
quotedleast
prices
in active
markets
(WLS).
Tablefor
3 displays results with control variables for heterogeneity
ordinary
least squares
(OLS)“using
and weighted
squares
risk
of
the
stock
and
will
be
negative
and
larger
in
magnitude
for a
items or quoted
prices in inactive markets for identical
acrosssimilar
time (fixed-effects
model).
less
liquid
stock.
items.” The transparency of such valuation parameters appears
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here
to reduce investor uncertainty regarding FV2 assets compared to
	Table 4 presents the results that include the Pastor-Stambaugh
All
models hold
similar
and significant
degreesasset
of validity.
Coefficients for both
Level 2factor
and Level
3 assets variable.
prove to beResults are quantitatively
investment
in FV3
assets.
Without further
decomposition
liquidity
as a control
statistically
the 5% probability
leveltowithin
eachspecific
model, with Level 3similar
assets carrying
at Table
the 1%3. The liquidity variable fails
within significant
each level,athowever,
I am unable
identify
to thosesignificance
presented in
probability
levelorwithin
regressions
presented
in Table 2 lack strong
r-squared
values.significance;
However, aftertherefore my presumption
securities
asseteach.
typesThe
thatbaseline
contribute
to increased
transparency.
to achieve
statistical
controlling for time, the OLS Decomposition of Beta with fixed-effects provided the
greatest the
goodness
of is
fitof
measurement
an stronger. Such
regarding
opacity
FV3 assetswith
becomes
Most salient to the analysis, FV3 assets carry with them a
r-squared value of just over 16%. Each model’s F-value proved statistically significant
as
well.
results with an included liquidity factor add an important degree of
strikingly positive coefficient. For example, in the OLS with fixed
qualitative
robustness
to the
study
inopaque
that I am able to differentiate
Interestingly,
thethe
results
estimateof
a negative
coefficient
for FV2
assets. Such results
suggest
that, relative
to the
more
effects model,
coefficient
7.613 provides
strong
evidence
between
the
contributions
of
liquidity
and opacity toward equity
FV3 that
assets,
FV2 assets in
carry
withreported
them much
less information
risk. In fact, it appears that investments in FV2 assets may actually
investments
assets
as Level
3 significantly
risk
of
financial
institutions.
Furthering
the work of Riedl and
reduce
a
firm’s
systematic
risk.
As
noted
earlier,
FV2
assets
are
required
to
be
valued
“using
quoted
prices
in
active
markets
for
contribute to systematic risk. The finding provides support for the
Serafeim
(2009),
I
conclude
that
information
similar
items
or
quoted
prices
in
inactive
markets
for
identical
items.”
The
transparency
of
such
valuation
parameters
appears
to risk for Level 3
first hypothesis that investments in opaque assets increase a firm’s
assets
appears
to
be
primarily
attributed
to opacity.
reduce
investor
uncertainty
regarding
FV2
assets
compared
to
investment
in
FV3
assets.
Without
further
asset
decomposition
systematic risk. Additionally, the results provide support for the
within
each
level,
however,
I
am
unable
to
identify
specific
securities
or
asset
types
that
contribute
to
increased
transparency.
second hypothesis that FV3 assets should have a greater impact on IV.C. Temporal Analysis
systematic
FV2 assets.
Most
salient risk
to thethan
analysis,
FV3 assets carry with them a strikingly positive coefficient.
For example,
in the
OLS with fixed
Flannery,
Kwan, and
Nimalendran
(2010) suggest that bank
effects
model,
the
coefficient
of
7.613
provides
strong
evidence
that
investments
in
assets
reported
as
Level
3
significantly
IV.B. Robustness
opacity varies across time. Though my study does not attempt to
contribute to systematic risk. The finding provides support for the first hypothesis validate
that investments
in opaque
assetstoincrease
this claim,
I am able
provideaevidence about the impact
While both
baseline regression
and time-controlled
firm’s systematic
risk. the
Additionally,
the results provide
support for themodels
second hypothesis
that
FV3
assets
should
have
a greater
of opacity on a systematic risk during
times of crisis and nonprovide
evidence
impact
on systematic
riskthat
thanFV3
FV2assets
assets.contribute to systematic risk, it is crisis. My third hypothesis predicts that during times of financial
possible that illiquidity of the assets, and not opacity, may be driving
IV.B.the
Robustness
results. To remedy this problem and ensure the models predict crisis, FV2 and FV3 assets should make greater contributions to
systematic risk.
the contributions
of opacity
rather
than liquidity,models
I expanded
While
both the baseline
regression
and time-controlled
providethe
evidence that FV3 assets contribute to systematic risk,
control
for liquidity
by inserting
into thethe results.
In order
to testthis
the problem
third hypothesis,
a Famait is model
possibletothat
illiquidity
of the assets,
and notanother
opacity,measure
may be driving
To remedy
and ensureI performed
the
regression
analysis.
A proxy
liquidity
computed
accordingthe model
Macbeth
(1973)forregression
procedure
plotted the quarterly
models
predict the
contributions
of for
opacity
ratherrisk
thanisliquidity,
I expanded
to control
liquidity by
inserting and
another
Specifically,
to the
methodology
of Pastor
(2003). risk
in Figure
2, which also
highlights
measure
into
the regression
analysis.and
A Stambaugh
proxy for liquidity
is computedcoefficients
according to
the methodology
of Pastor
and key events
an OLS
time-series
regression
fortime-series
each bankregression
i is estimated.
throughout the financial crisis.. Notice the spike in the coefficient
Stambaugh
(2003).
Specifically,
an OLS
for each bank i is estimated.
for FV3 assets during the period January 2008 to January 2009. In
rreei,i,d1,
sign(r eei,i, d,d, qq )*
)* vvi,i,d,d,qq +e
 i,i,d+1
= qi,i,qq +f i,i, qq ** rri,i, d,d, qq 
+ gi,i, qq ** sign(r
d+1,qq 
d1,, qq (3)
fact, the coefficients for(3)
Level 3 assets during the third and fourth
quarters
of
2008
are
nearly
twice as great in magnitude as from
r d, q equity
is the equity
return
day d in
q; excessthe
In (3),In r(3),
return for
firm for
i onfirm
day di on
in quarter
q; quarter
r e i, d, q , the
equity
over in
thethe
CRSP
value-weighted
for
i, d, q isi, the
samereturn
quarters
previous
year. As markets
suddenly revise
e
day drin i,quarter
and vi,equity
dollar trading
day d in quarterfor
q. Theexpectations
equation is intended
to capturefor
return
and valuations
suchreversals
assets, the crisis is further
over thevolume
CRSPon
value-weighted
d, q , theq;excess
d, q , thereturn
related to lack of liquidity. The coefficient of reflects the liquidity risk of the stockexacerbated.
and will be negative and larger in magnitude for
ahttps://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol12/iss1/7
less liquid stock.
4
Insert Table 4 about here
Table 4 presents the results that include the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor as a control variable. Results are quantitatively
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Table 3: Decomposition of equity beta with fixed effects, regressing on Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Assets.
Table 3: Decomposition of equity beta with fixed effects, regressing on Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Assets.
OLS Decomposition of Beta with
Fixed Effects for Time

WLS Decomposition of Beta with
Fixed Effects for Time

Decomposition of Beta with Fixed Effects for
Time (Clustered at Firm Level)

Variable

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Asset
Portfolios
Other Assets/Intercept
FV2
FV3
Liab_to_assets

1.01857***
-0.40829***
7.61304***
0.14341

3.23
-3.18
4.73
0.44

1.08249***
-0.35571***
9.86821***
-0.03119

4.62
-3.12
6.4
0.8974

1.0824908***
-0.3557121**
9.868206***
-0.0311871

7.34
-2.31
4.36
-0.25

Time Dummy
Variables
Year 08
Year 09
Year 10

0.45543***
0.68782***
0.1224

3.73
5.86
1.03

0.11575
0.56902***
0.17774

1.19
6.01
1.89

0.1157532
0.5690224***
0.1777365**

0.51
6.27
2.07

Model Analysis
N
R2
Adj R2
F-Value

786
0.1622
0.1558
25.14

786
0.1494
0.1428
22.8

786
0.1494

*** p<.01, ** p< .05, and * p< .10

This table presents the results of regressing market beta on the Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Assets of firm i in quarter j while controlling for heterogeneity across time using fixed effects. The addition
of dummy variables for time (Year08, Year09, Year10) in the OLS and WLS models adds robustness to the study. By adding time dummy variables the goodness of fit for the regression (Adj R2) shows
a relatively large jump from between 3% and 5% in the non-time controlled models to between 14% and 16% in the time controlled models. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance of all relevant
variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

	To further validate my claim, I performed a seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) to compare fair value asset coefficients
during crisis and non-crisis periods. Though economic significance
appears obvious in Figure 2, a SUR is required to substantiate the
statistical significance. Results of the SUR models with variables
for both crisis and non-crisis periods are presented in Table 5. As
expected, F-values that test the difference in coefficients reveal
that coefficients for both FV2 and FV3 assets are statistically
higher during the crisis period compared to the coefficients during
the non-crisis period, thereby confirming the presumption that
investments in opaque assets carry varying degrees of systematic
risk across time.
V. Conclusion
To summarize, I find that opacity contributes to financial
instability by exposing firms with heavy investments in Level
3 fair value assets to a marked degree of systematic risk during
times of crisis. The lack of transparency associated with these
assets noticeably alters investors’ risk perceptions, as they face
uncertainty regarding the valuation parameters used to report
Level 3 fair value assets. Hence, firms holding large portfolios
of opaque assets may be among the first to feel the effects of an
oncoming financial firestorm.
An examination of investments in informationally opaque
fair value assets by bank holding companies yields significant
evidence that opacity contributes to the systematic risk of a bank.
Results signify that the market valuation of financial institutions
is a product of those institutions’ investments in Level 2 and 3
fair value assets. Additionally, the results imply that contributions
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2011

of opacity to systematic risk are not consistent over time. During
periods of turmoil, investments in opaque assets create a greater
degree of systematic risk than in non-crisis periods.
	The results suggest that the recent conversation about
disclosure standards and mark-to-market accounting during times
of crisis are legitimate. Recent implementation of fair value
standards has allowed us to better understand how investors
value different types of assets during varying market conditions.
Fluctuations in the contributions of assets to systematic risk over
time, particularly during crisis periods, indicated that current
disclosure requirements still may not be sufficient to completely
assuage investor uncertainty concerning such assets. Further
regulation in the banking industry to bring greater degrees
of transparency to highly opaque assets may increase market
efficiency and alleviate the intensity of financial downturns. In
short, enhanced disclosure standards for illiquid and opaque assets
appear warranted.
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Table4:4:
Decomposition
equity
beta
adding
Pastor-Stambaugh
liquidity
factor.

OLS Decomposition of Beta with
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Factor

Variable

Coefficient

WLS Decomposition of Beta with
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Factor

t-statistic

Coefficient

OLS Decomposition of Beta with PastorStambaugh Liquidity Factor (Clusterd at FirmLevel)

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Asset Portfolios
Other
Assets/Intercept
FV2
FV3
Liquidity
Liab_to_assets

1.01711**
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1.07625***

4.6
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-.40660**
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-0.67
0.44
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-0.0278478

-2.31
4.42
-0.76
-0.22

Time Dummy
Variables
Year 08
Year 09
Year 10

0.45904***
0.68945***
0.12471

3.75
5.87
1.04

0.12366
.57367***
.18319*

1.27
6.05
1.94

0.1236617
.5736719***
.1831876**

0.56
6.11
2.04

Model Analysis
N
R2
Adj R2

786
0.1627
0.1552

786
0.1513
0.1436

786
0.1513

*** p<.01, ** p< .05, and * p< .10

Figure 2: Fair Value Coefficients Across Time

This table presents the results of regressing market beta on the Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Assets of firm i in quarter j with a proxy for liquidity risk. The proxy for liquidity risk is computed
according to the methodology of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Qualitative analysis of the results remains similar to results of fixed-effects OLS models in Table 3. . ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance of all relevant variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.

Figure 2: Fair Value Coefficients Across Time
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Table 5: Fama-Macbeth procedure results/tests for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods.
Table 5: Fama-Macbeth procedure results/tests for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods.

OLS Test for Differences Between
Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods

WLS Test for Differences Between
Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods

Fama-Macbeth Implied Betas

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Quarter

FV2 Coefficient

Intercept
FV2_Crisis
FV2_NonCrisis
FV3_Crisis
FV3_NonCrisis
Liab_to_assets
Year 08
Year 09
Year 10

1.1153***
0.02599
-.65430***
10.66145***
3.43554
0.14929
0.28095**
0.5916***
0.12186

3.61
0.13
-4.13
4.63
1.61
0.47
2.29
5.11
1.04

1.15516***
-0.04792
-.47593***
15.12463***
5.26646***
-0.01392
-0.04111
.48130***
0.09226

5.05
-0.26
-3.53
6.38
2.72
-0.06
-0.42
5.16
1.86

Model Analysis

F-Value

Pr > F

F-Value

Pr > F

7.81
5.36

0.0053
0.0209

3.63
10.47

0.0571
0.0013

31-Mar-07
30-Jun-07
30-Sep-07
31-Dec-07
31-Mar-08
30-Jun-08
30-Sep-08
31-Dec-08
31-Mar-09
30-Jun-09
30-Sep-09
31-Dec-09
31-Mar-10
30-Jun-10
30-Sep-10

0.47889
0.7145
0.32244
0.07578
-0.53859
-0.31685
-0.075
0.06075
-0.10543
-0.81894
-0.46253
-0.36429
-0.08238
-0.33475
-0.40045

Variable

FV2
FV3

FV3 Coefficient
6.9137
8.3525
9.9758
14.291
11.9109
13.1637
20.7681
19.4953
11.4045
8.7906
5.9243
11.4266
12.7273
5.4026
2.1241

*** p<.01, ** p< .05, and * p< .10

This table presents the quarterly implied equity betas of FV2 and FV3 assets from March ’07 through September ’10. It also presents results of seemingly unrelated regressions to test for significance of
coefficients in crisis and non-crisis periods. F-value’s reveal that the coefficients are statistically higher in crisis periods (defined as March ’08 to January ’09). . ***, **, and * represent statistical
significance of all relevant variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Mentor Comments: Professor Jeff Jones describes the manner
in which Jody took advantage of a recent change in accounting
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disclosure requirements to explore the relationship between
opacity of assets and bank risk, noting the independence and
sophistication of his work.
As an important supplier of credit to the economy, a healthy
banking industry is essential for economic prosperity. The
opacity of the banking industry, however, can jeopardize
the health of the industry (and the overall economy) since
opacity fosters price contagion that exacerbates the cycle
of speculative bubbles and crashes that create financial
instability. Price contagion that arises in opaque markets can
manifest itself in a number of ways, one of which is a change
in the composition of risk. Since opacity makes it difficult for
investors to “see inside” individual firms, it tends to decrease
idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk and increase systematic risk.
When the systematic risk of all firms in an industry becomes
elevated, it creates a high degree of return synchronicity. In
such an environment, negative information about a single
firm tends to drive down the stock prices of all firms in
the industry, creating the potential for a systemic crisis.
Consequently, understanding how the activities and assets of
banks impact this process is of critical importance to abating
the negative consequences of opacity.
I became acquainted with Jody in 2010 while he was a
student in two of my courses. During this time, we had a
number of out of class discussions regarding the causes and
consequences of the recent financial crisis. I shared with him
some of the research projects I had been working on related
to the opacity of the banking industry as a contributing
factor to the financial crisis. Soon after, he approached me
with an idea that he wished to explore for his Senior Honors
Thesis. His work on this project has consistently exceeded
7
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my expectations of an undergraduate student, and in fact
is of a quality that would rival that of many PhD students.
I am extremely impressed by how well Jody was able to
independently process the literature and recognize how to
make a significant contribution.
In this project, Jody uses a novel approach, made possible by
a recent accounting change, to investigate how investments
in opaque assets impact the systematic risk of a bank. The
recently adopted SFAS 157 requires banks to classify certain
assets into 3 levels and report them at fair value. Level 1

https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol12/iss1/7

assets are considered relatively transparent, and Level 2
and Level 3 assets are considered increasingly opaque,
respectively. Jody finds that investing in greater quantities of
Level 3 assets significantly increases the systematic risk of a
bank. Moreover, the contribution to systematic risk for both
Level 2 and Level 3 assets was much higher during the height
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis compared to periods of
relative tranquility. Thus, Jody effectively demonstrates how
the opaqueness of banks can exacerbate a financial crisis,
providing useful information for policymakers and regulators.
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